Northern Miner podcast host Adrian Pocobelli sat down with global security risk analyst George McLeod, mining partner at Critical Risk Team, in June for a wide-ranging discussion on the geopolitical risks reshaping mining. The conversation covered Russia’s setbacks in the Sahel, the rise of jihadist groups in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, resource nationalism, security risks for miners such as Barrick, instability in the DRC and Myanmar, and the broader implications of a less interventionist West.
Adrian Pocobelli: Joining us today, I’m very pleased to welcome back to the Northern Miner Podcast George McLeod, mining partner at Critical Risk Team. George, it’s great to see you again.
George McLeod: Thank you, Adrian. Great to be back.
Adrian Pocobelli: You’ve given us so many insights over the years, especially with Barrick’s Loulo-Gounkoto complex in Mali. I wanted to bring you back because of everything that’s going on in West Africa right now, which isn’t getting a ton of press, but seems to be quite significant. So, as far as Mali and Niger, what are you seeing? What’s going on in the Sahel? What should we be paying attention to?
George McLeod: The biggest development over the past couple of years has been the move of Russia into this region. It’s obviously a very important region from a mining perspective; a major producer of gold and other minerals. This is a coup government in Mali that has a serious problem with Islamic extremism. The Sahel region is now the most active region in the world in terms of Al-Qaeda-linked and ISIS-linked Islamic extremists, the most important being a group called JNIM, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, which is active and even dominant in many areas of Mali.
This is obviously very important for Western mining companies, most notably Barrick, which has a very large operation in Mali. Russia effectively replaced the West as the foremost partner of the Malian government over the past two years. The French and other coalition members were previously backing the Malian government, actively with troops and airstrikes, in the fight against these Islamic groups. But Russia, under the Africa Corps, which is the successor to Wagner Group, took the place of the French and Western forces and has been fighting alongside the junta in Mali.
I’ve been following that closely to see how it developed. Russia has the attractiveness of not being concerned about issues of corruption and human rights abuses. The feeling from the Malian side was that this more ‘no questions asked’ approach from their Russian friends might bring an end to the rebel movement. That assumption has been proven very wrong. JNIM has actually increased its attacks and hold over rural areas in Mali. It successfully expelled Russian troops from a major northern city called Kidal, and assassinated the minister of defence in May, which is a hugely symbolic development and a real black eye for the Russian advisers and military presence there, which numbers about 2,500.
Things are going downhill in Mali. As for the impact on the mining sector, Barrick is located in the south, which has not been as hard hit by these insurgency groups. It’s right along the Senegalese border, so they haven’t directly been impacted to the same degree. But I wouldn’t be surprised if this movement does migrate south. What I’m hearing is that companies like Barrick are preparing for that type of outcome. I expect the situation in Mali will continue to decline.
Adrian Pocobelli: It wasn’t that long ago, let’s call it three or four weeks ago, that we had the news story that Barrick was letting go of, I believe, 600 contractors. There was no real reason given, at least as far as I can recall. It didn’t seem to be saying it was about security, but the timing is weird. It looked like they had just secured a deal in the last few months with the government to open the mine. It seems to me that it is about security. Is that how you read it?
George McLeod: The situation has changed for mining companies. About a year or a year and a half ago, they were facing significant pressure from the Mali government, partly because the government had been emboldened by its new friendship with the Russians. I said this at the time: if you’re a Western company dealing in a country that is now allied with Russia, you’re not going to have a very good time fighting any type of nationalist effort by the government to seize assets. You’re not going to get a fair hearing in court. This did have the effect of emboldening the Malian government. They placed various restrictions on mining companies and effectively changed the terms of the contracts under which they were operating.
However, as I’ve mentioned, the Russians have not been successful in securing the security situation, which has weakened the position of the Malian government. In a nutshell, this relieves pressure on mining companies such as Barrick. You’re dealing with a much weaker central state, which gives them a stronger hand. In effect, mining companies are now the only game in town in terms of revenue for the Mali government.
What we could see is a situation where these mining companies operate as almost autonomous – I don’t want to say mini-states – but autonomous entities in the south, where they procure all their supplies through Senegal and foreign countries. They export all of their concentrate, provide their own security and infrastructure, and all of their fuel is internal and self-sufficient, which, in a way, might not be a bad thing for a mining company. The Mali government hasn’t provided anything in terms of infrastructure or support. At best, they’re an annoyance. At worst, frankly, they’ve been a danger to executives and mining staff. A weaker and more irrelevant central apparatus could maybe even benefit these companies.
Adrian Pocobelli: As far as JNIM and these insurgents are concerned, for lack of a better term, do you know what they want? Are they simply trying to take land? Is this to build a caliphate? Are they targeting mines so that they can get money? What do they want?
George McLeod: It is part of the global jihadist movement. That’s something they’re very proud of. Their propaganda celebrated the overthrow of the Assad government in Syria, and they’re very much in line with Al-Qaeda. Their demands, as such, are for a caliphate.
On a practical level, JNIM has been very adept at holding rural territory and villages, and inserting itself in local madrasas and schools. What they’ve been less effective at is moves on the capital. Back in 2012, they attempted to take over Bamako, but in doing so they exposed themselves to airstrikes and were defeated quite badly. Since then, they’ve learned their lesson.
I would add that they were one of the first organizations in the world to use drone technology. I was speaking with a friend of mine who served there after 2012, and he mentioned that even before 2018, they were using drones to film their attacks. It was a natural progression to affix bombs to those drones. They do have a fairly advanced level of technology. They use swarming techniques on motorcycles combined with drones.
How do they fund themselves? Through extortion, through kidnapping, which has targeted more Middle Easterners, and through capturing government assets. With respect to mining companies, they haven’t been terribly verbal on that issue. I would add, though, that mining companies such as Barrick have very considerable security services protecting their mines, which is understandable. Barrick uses a local contractor called AMM, which is a murky operation. They have at least a couple hundred security staff protecting that mine.
What I’ve heard is that JNIM would probably have a very difficult time carrying out any type of direct attack on Barrick’s operation, but it’s certainly something to worry about. Senegal, which is just across the border, is worried about possible spillover. If the fighting did get too close to the border, I wouldn’t dismiss the idea that Senegal could possibly play a more active role, possibly even within Malian territory. Senegal has very good, well-trained and disciplined armed forces that far outstrip Mali’s. I’m not making that prediction, but if it does continue to spread south, which it is doing at this point, I wouldn’t discount the possibility of Senegal getting a little more involved.
Adrian Pocobelli: It really does seem to be a regional situation. To the east, we also have Niger, and we had that kind of wild story that they had a stockpile of uranium by the airport, then the airport was attacked, then a report that it was flown out to Russia via Libya. What is your sense of Niger? Is it basically a similar situation? Is it different? How do you read Niger?
George McLeod: Niger, under the Traore government, also a military junta, just like Mali and Burkina Faso, has an extremely serious situation with the same armed group I was just discussing in connection with Mali, JNIM, as well as other actors. Also like Mali, they have joined hands with the Russians. And also like Mali, the Russians have been unable to stem these attacks, which are spreading through the country.
As you mentioned, there was an attack on the national airport, which has huge symbolic value. This comes amid what we were discussing in the Malian context: increased resource nationalism on the part of the Niger junta. They’ve made moves to nationalize the country’s largest uranium mine. That’s in arbitration. I would expect, again, that with the unimpressive results the Russians are delivering in that country and in that region, it could reduce the Niger government’s ability to lean hard on mining companies and extract additional rents from them.
Adrian Pocobelli: So Russia is distracted, and we might say the asymmetric and changing nature of war in the last few years makes it not crazy to think that perhaps they are able, through drone technology and what have you, to do real damage.
George McLeod: Absolutely. As we’ve seen in the Iran conflict, this is a very good environment to be a terrorist militant group or a junior state. Iran was able to hold back the United States through very inexpensive drone technology. I see no reason why that couldn’t translate to the African fronts we’re discussing here.
Adrian Pocobelli: Another aspect you mentioned a few minutes ago that we’re seeing in the region is resource nationalism, particularly in Burkina Faso. That’s a trend we’ve seen for a while. Is there anything you would add to that, or use to colour that phenomenon?
George McLeod: The main issues on resource nationalism in that region, aside from the countries we’ve talked about, are obviously Burkina Faso and Guinea. On the other side, we have Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia. Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia are very liberal and are basically opening their countries to mining, and having a lot of success in that regard. Burkina Faso, as you mentioned, is very much toward the nationalist side of this discussion. They’ve been moving against Western mining companies. There are talks of nationalization, and aside from that, there are also issues with increased political instability and rebel movements.
Adrian Pocobelli: As we zoom out on West Africa and the Sahel, is there anything more to add? How should we look at the region? We’ve looked at some individual countries and made some comparisons. Zooming out, how do you see the region going? Where is this going in your view?
George McLeod: At this time, it’s split between destabilized and pro-Russian governments, such as Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, and more pro-Western, liberal countries, which include Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. The former ones are, frankly, in serious decline. There are questions over whether they can even survive as nation-states. For mining companies operating there, it’s very difficult to say what’s going to happen. As I mentioned in Mali, they could potentially survive with no interactions with the state at all. In Niger, that might be a little more difficult, but this has always been a very high-risk jurisdiction, and it will continue to be so going forward.
Adrian Pocobelli: Quickly before we leave Africa, do you have any observations on the DRC and what’s going on there? It looked like the rebel group there, the M23, reaching out to the U.S. to make a deal, kind of looked like they were maybe feeling a little more desperate – that they better make a deal with the U.S., otherwise they might be lunch. Do you have any thoughts on eastern DRC?
George McLeod: The U.S. has made various statements about the DRC and about getting involved in that conflict. Whether we want to believe those statements or not is another thing. They made other statements relating to Nigeria to intervene there. The U.S. has a record of making some interventions in Africa. Obviously, after the Iraq war in 2003, they put troops on the ground in Liberia to help depose the Charles Taylor government. They were involved in Mali. They have bases. Whether they would actually put boots on the ground to involve themselves in the DRC, I highly doubt. I don’t really take that one too seriously. But the DRC is part of the general issue in Africa of increasing instability and rebel movements, and of lower Western involvement on the African continent.
Adrian Pocobelli: While I have you here, George, as we start to wrap up, what are some other big observations you’re making when you consider the geopolitics of mining? They have become directly related in recent years. They always have been, but they seem to be much more so these days. Are there any big-picture observations you’re making as you look at the world stage?
George McLeod: Globally, the focus from the major powers is very much on other major powers. This impacts the mining sector because mining companies operate in peripheral countries. Ten or 15 years ago, the focus was on smaller countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso. Now there’s very little focus on those countries. The United States is preoccupied with China, Russia, Iran and Israel. President Trump doesn’t know or care about these peripheral states. We’ve moved from these smaller countries, and the counter-terrorism narrative in general, being front and centre to being kind of off the radar.
For mining companies, that means they’re on their own in many respects. They need to develop their own counter-terrorism measures. They need to have their own security. And when they get in a dispute with a local government, they often just need to handle that on their own and can’t have the same expectations with respect to backing from embassies and their own governments.
This can present opportunities because it can give them a degree of autonomy, but it can also have negative repercussions because they are on their own and have to manage their own relations with often hostile governments. As we’ve mentioned before, this is coming amid a backdrop of higher metals prices, where these developing-country governments are very hard-pressed for cash. When governments are hard-pressed for cash, they start to see minerals and mines as national property rather than private-sector assets. We’re going to see that increasing push of resource nationalism in West Africa and in many other developing countries. Mining companies are going to have to handle that on their own, unfortunately or fortunately.
Adrian Pocobelli: Some people try to link the conflict in Ukraine with the conflict in Iran, and even the Sahel. How do you see the big picture here? Any thoughts on Ukraine or the Strait of Hormuz?
George McLeod: Russia is working hard to make some kind of agreement with Ukraine. That’s what I’m hearing. That may or may not work this summer, but as that’s going on, we can expect to see an escalation in Russian activity, not just in Ukraine, but possibly in Africa and even in some of the Russian-aligned countries in Europe. So that’s an issue.
Obviously, as we’ve discussed with the Strait of Hormuz, that has empowered these smaller countries. There have even been whisperings in the Strait of Malacca, which passes through Indonesia and Singapore, that Indonesia was considering putting taxes or levies on ships going through that corridor, looking at the example of Iran. They’ve backtracked on some of that, but it does go back to this macro issue of the U.S. pullout from direct involvement in peripheral countries and increasing isolationism, punctuated by what we saw in Iran, which is more in the form of airstrikes and missile strikes, but without boots on the ground.
For mining companies, this means they can’t count on U.S. military support, and the counter-terrorism agenda has really gone onto the back burner. That would change if there was some kind of attack in the West, but on the ground, counter-terrorism is just not a priority for Western countries.
Adrian Pocobelli: As far as Myanmar as well, of course, there’s heavy rare earths. We had an election in January, if I’m not mistaken. What is your sense of what’s happening in Myanmar? It seems like China is perhaps getting a little more serious. What is your read on Myanmar?
George McLeod: Myanmar held sham elections recently. There was a coup d’état in 2022, which brought Min Aung Hlaing, the general of that country, into power. It’s been a very hardline dictatorship since then. There are huge issues with civil war. There are ethnic groups that have been fighting for decades. That’s actually the longest-running civil war in the world. Most of the mining is concentrated in areas controlled by rebel groups, most notably the United Wa State Army and the Kachin area, which are minority groups. There is a major tin mine in areas controlled by the Wa. Chinese investment is largely in these rebel areas that aren’t controlled by the government.
I don’t put a lot of stock in these ideas that Myanmar is going to open up and become a major investment destination. That’s been tried before. I was actually quite involved in Myanmar after their last effort in 2011. The Japanese flooded in, with pretty much every major Japanese conglomerate taking over local operations in everything from consumer goods to cars and infrastructure. Almost every one of those projects failed, and those assets were sold for pennies on the dollar between 2019 and 2022. I don’t expect much from Myanmar in terms of serious mining investment.
The investment right now is, as I say, in rebel areas. As context, the United Wa State Army, which controls many of these mines, is one of the biggest methamphetamine producers in the world. One of their main strongholds in the north is a wild-west, lawless area with markets filled with illegal wildlife, tiger bones and illegal gambling. This is not a mainstream jurisdiction by any measure. Despite Myanmar’s incredible potential – it has pretty much every mineral known to man, as well as oil – I don’t see much going on there in terms of it becoming a serious player in the mining sector.
Adrian Pocobelli: Fascinating. Any final thoughts for us? What should we consider looking ahead? We’re halfway through 2026. What are you looking at? What’s got your attention?
George McLeod: I think the metals market is obviously cooling after a big run in the early part of the year. The new Fed chairman is trying to present himself as being much of a change against this quantitative-easing, low-interest-rate policy that has dominated. I don’t think he’s going to succeed in that overall, but that doesn’t mean he couldn’t shake up the market over the medium term. I’m quite bearish in the medium term for precious metals.
But ultimately, he’s going to have to fall into line with the way the U.S. economy works, which is that it needs low interest rates and money printing, so to speak, in order for the growth rates Trump is demanding in terms of both GDP and the stock market to continue. Once that comes into focus, I’m much more bullish on precious metals and on base metals as well, which have held up much better than gold has. But we could expect the sector overall to continue its growth trajectory after possibly a slowdown going into early next year.
Adrian Pocobelli: George McLeod, mining partner at Critical Risk Team, thanks for joining us and sharing all your insights and observations on the world as we see it here.
George McLeod: Thank you so much, Adrian.
This transcript has been edited for brevity and clarity from an episode of The Northern Miner Podcast, which you can listen to on Spotify, YouTube and SoundCloud below.
